The stochastic multi-armed bandit problem is a classic model illustrating the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. We study the effects of competition and cooperation on this tradeoff. Suppose there are k arms and two players, Alice and Bob. In every round, each player pulls an arm, receives the resulting reward, and observes the choice of the other player but not their reward. Alice's utility is Γ A + λΓ B (and similarly for Bob), where Γ A is Alice's total reward and λ ∈ [−1, 1] is a cooperation parameter. At λ = −1 the players are competing in a zero-sum game, at λ = 1, they are fully cooperating, and at λ = 0, they are neutral: each player's utility is their own reward. The model is related to the economics literature on strategic experimentation, where usually players can observe each other's rewards.
Introduction
The multi-armed bandit learning problem is a paradigm that captures the tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation [GGW11, BCB12, Sli19, LS19] . We study the effects of competition and cooperation on exploration in a multiplayer stochastic bandit problem, where multiple players are selecting arms and receiving the corresponding rewards in each round. Examples of scenarios that can be captured by this model include competing firms in a saturated market, which can be seen as a zero-sum game where the utility of a player is the difference between their rewards and the rewards of the opponent. At the other extreme, the interaction of organisms that are (almost) genetically identical, such as ants and bees, can be modeled by a fully cooperative game [Ham64] where the utility of a player is the sum of the rewards of all players.
We consider a unifying framework that interpolates between these extremes, and focus on the so-called one-armed bandit problem, where the choices are playing a predictable arm or a risky one. The feedback received by each player is their own reward and the action taken by the other player. If Alice's total reward is Γ A and Bob's total reward is Γ B , then Alice's utility is Γ A + λΓ B and similarly for Bob, where λ ∈ R. We study three choices for λ: the zero-sum case (λ = −1), the fully cooperative case (λ = 1), and the neutral setting (λ = 0).
A key question in the zero sum scenario is to quantify the value of information obtained by exploring (i.e. experimenting with the risky arm). Note that while Alice does not know Bob's rewards, she may try to infer them from his actions, which in turn may lead to Bob trying to change his actions to hide information from her. We find that under optimal play, information is less valuable in the zero-sum game than in the single player setting, which leads to reduced exploration compared to the one player optimum (Theorem 1). However, Theorem 2 shows that information still has positive value. Our model is close to the games of incomplete information analyzed by Aumann and Maschler [AM95] , where a player may forego some rewards to hide information from their opponent.
In contrast to the zero-sum scenario, we show that exploration is increased in the fully cooperative setting compared to the single player optimum (Theorem 3). We also study the neutral regime and find that in a range of parameters, with probability 1 the players explore in every Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the equilibrium is also perfect Bayesian, then the players learn from each other: each player gets in expectation strictly higher total reward than they would when playing alone (Theorem 4). A corollary is that with positive probability the players do not follow the same trajectory in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Rothschild [Rot74] studied the theory of market pricing using a two-armed bandit model and asked the question of whether players eventually settle on the same arm. Aoyagi [Aoy98, Aoy11] answered this question positively in the model with imperfect monitoring, where players can see each other's actions but only their own rewards, under an assumption on the distributions.
Another natural feedback model is perfect monitoring, where all players see the actions and rewards of each other. This is not interesting in the zero sum case (see Remark 3), but in the neutral and cooperative cases it is close to classic papers in the economics of strategic experimentation. Bolton and Harris [BH99] , and Cripps, Keller, and Rady [CKR05] study strategic experimentation with perfect monitoring, while Heidhues, Rady, and Strack [HRS15] study imperfect monitoring where players can additionally communicate via cheap talk.
In statistical learning, there has been work on multi-player bandits (e.g., Lai, Jiang, and Poor [LJP08] ; Liu and Zhao [LZ10] ), where multiple cooperating players select arms and then collect the corresponding rewards. If the players collide at an arm, then they receive a reward of zero. A different line of work studied the effects of competition on learning. For example, Mansour, Slivkins, and Wu [MSW18] consider a setting where players arrive and depart over time, while Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [RSV07] study multi-player learning in the one-armed bandit model, where the move from the risky to the predictable arm is irreversible.
Model
Suppose there are two players, Alice and Bob, each of which pulls one of K arms in each round. The rewards are drawn from {0, 1}: for each arm k there is a prior distribution µ k so that the success probability is picked (by Nature) from µ k before the game starts. In the finite horizon version, the players play for T + 1 rounds indexed from 0 to T . In the discounted version, the game continues forever, but the players have value reduced by a factor of β t for the reward in round t, where β ∈ (0, 1) 1 .
Rewards In every round, each player collects the reward from the arm they pulled (even if both chose the same arm). We denote by γ A (t) and γ B (t) the random variable corresponding to the reward received by Alice and Bob, respectively in round t ≥ 0. The total reward of player i in a finite horizon game is Γ i = T t=0 γ i (t), while player i's reward in the discounted game is
In every round, after selecting the arm to pull, each player observes their own reward and the action taken by the other player, but not their reward.
Utilities The utility of each player is a combination of their own reward and the reward of the other player. More precisely, there is a cooperation parameter λ ∈ [−1, 1] so that Alice's utility is u A = Γ A + λ · Γ B , while Bob's utility is u B = Γ B + λ · Γ A . For λ = −1, we have a zero-sum game while for λ = 1, we obtain a fully cooperative model. The case λ = 0 is the neutral regime where each player's utility is their own total reward.
Arms We focus on the so-called one-armed bandit problem, where there is a predictable left arm, denoted L, with known success probability p and a risky right arm, denoted R, with a prior µ that is not a point mass. A player is said to "explore" if that player selects the right arm at least once. Denote by m = 1 0 x dµ(x) the mean of the prior µ, by w = 1 0 (x − m) 2 dµ(x) > 0 the variance of µ, and by M * the maximum of the support of µ:
Strategies A pure strategy for player i is a function σ i : t∈N H t × Z t i → {L, R}, where H t is the public history (i.e. the sequence of past actions of both players) and Z t i is the private history of player i, containing the bits observed by i. Thus the pure strategy tells player i which arm to play next given the public and private history. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. The expected utility of a player is computed using the player's beliefs about the private information of the other player.
Figure 1: Different regions in which players explore depending on the success probability p of the left arm as a function of the prior µ and the discount factor β. Here m is the mean of µ, while g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins index of the right arm,p is the threshold where for all p <p competing players explore, p * the threshold where for all p > p * competing players do not explore, p the threshold where for all p < p cooperating players explore, and p • the threshold above which cooperating players do not explore. M * is the maximum of the support of µ. Solid intervals are non-empty, dotted intervals may be empty.
Our Results
We analyze the properties of the game when the players are competing (λ = −1), cooperating (λ = 1), and neutral (λ = 0), for both the discounted and finite horizon settings. In the discounted setting, the Gittins index g = g(µ, β) of the right arm is defined as the infimum of the success probabilities p where playing always left is optimal for a single player. The index was first defined by Bradt, Johnson, and Karlin [BJK56] and its importance for the multi-armed bandit problem was shown by Gittins and Jones [GJ74] ; see also [Git79, BF85] .
Competing Players (λ = −1)
Our first theorem shows that when using optimal strategies, competing players explore less than a single player, for both discounted games and finite horizon. This zero-sum game has a value by Sion's minimax theorem [Sio58].
Theorem 1 (Competing players explore less). Suppose arm L has a known probability p and arm R has i.i.d. rewards with unknown success probability with prior µ (which is not a point mass). Assume that Alice and Bob are playing optimally in the zero sum game with discount factor β. Then there exists a threshold p * = p * (µ, β) ∈ (m, g), where g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins index of the right arm, such that for all p > p * , with probability 1 the players will not explore arm R. More precisely, define p * = inf p : arm R is not explored in any optimal play (2)
Remark 1. Note that p * is uniformly bounded away from g = g(µ, β) as β → 1.
An analogue of Theorem 1 for finite horizon is shown in Section 3 (see Theorem 5).
In the single player one-armed bandit, obtaining information about the risky arm can compensate for a lower mean reward compared to the predictable arm. In the zero-sum case, the value of acquiring information is less clear since it can be copied by the opponent in the next round. The next theorem shows that such information still has value: competing players do not follow a myopic policy of pulling the arm with the highest mean reward in each round.
Theorem 2 (Competing players are not completely myopic). In the setting of Theorem 1, there exists a thresholdp =p(m, µ, β) > m such that for all p <p, with probability 1 both players will explore arm R in the initial round of any optimal play.
The proof shows that one can takep = m + βw/2, where w is the variance of µ.
Cooperating Players (λ = 1)
In the fully cooperative model the players aim to optimize the same function, namely the sum of their rewards. The players are allowed to agree on their strategies before play.
Theorem 3 (Cooperating players explore more). Consider two cooperating players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass.
Then there exists p > g = g(µ, β), so that for all p < p, at least one of the players explores the right arm with positive probability under any optimal strategy pair maximizing their total reward.
We also show that cooperating players do not explore indiscriminately for every value of p. Proposition 1 makes this precise by showing a non-empty interval for p in which cooperating players do not explore.
Neutral Players (λ = 0)
For neutral play the utility of each player is their total reward and the solution concepts will be Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Recall player i's strategy σ i is a best response to player j's strategy σ j if no strategy σ i achieves a higher expected utility against σ j . A mixed strategy profile (σ A , σ B ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if σ i is a best response for each player i. For brevity, we refer to such strategy profiles as Nash equilibria.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is the version of subgame perfect equilibrium for games with incomplete information. A pair of strategies (σ A , σ B ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if (i) starting from any information set, subsequent play is optimal, and (ii) beliefs are updated consistently with Bayes' rule on every path of play that occurs with positive probability. Such equilibria are guaranteed to exist in this setting (see Fudenberg [FL83] ).
We will say that players learn from each other under some strategies if the total expected reward of each player is strictly higher than it would be for a single player using an optimal strategy. This can happen if the players infer additional information from each other's actions, beyond the bits that they observe themselves.
Theorem 4 (Neutral players learn from each other). Consider two neutral players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Then in any Nash equilibrium:
1. For all p < g(µ, β), with probability 1 at least one player explores. Moreover, the probability that no player explores by time t decays exponentially in t.
2. Suppose p ∈ (p * , g), where p * is the threshold above which competing players do not explore 2 . If the equilibrium is furthermore perfect Bayesian, then every (neutral) player has expected reward strictly higher than a single player using an optimal strategy.
We note that when p > g there are perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the players do not explore; for example, always playing left is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A corollary of Theorem 4 is that in the range (p * , g) there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the (neutral) players have the same trajectory with probability 1.
Roadmap of the Paper
Section 2 includes more detailed discussion of related work. Section 3 has the analysis for competing players, showing that they explore less than a single player, but are also not completely myopic. Section 4 studies fully cooperating players, showing they explore more than a single player. Section 5 studies neutral players, showing that they learn from each other.
Related Work
This work is related to several streams of research. Bandit learning problems with multiple players have been studied in the collision model, where players are pulling arms independently. The players are cooperating-trying to maximize the sum of rewards-and can agree on a protocol before play, but cannot communicate during the game. Whenever there is a collision at some arm, then no player that selected that arm receives any reward. This is motivated by applications such as cognitive radio networks, where interference at a channel destroys the signal for all the players involved. Several research directions in this setting include designing algorithms that allow the players to maximize the total reward, depending on whether the environment is adversarial (see Alatur Aoyagi [Aoy98, Aoy11] studies bandit learning with the same feedback model as ours, when there are multiple neutral players and two risky arms. The main result is that assuming a property on the distributions of the arms, in any Nash equilibrium the players settle eventually on the same arm. This is related to Aumann's agreement theorem [Aum76] , which shows in a Bayesian setting that rational players cannot agree to disagree. While this game is not captured by the formal model of the theorem in [Aum76] , the result is similar conceptually.
Bolton and Harris [BH99] study a multiplayer learning problem in in the one-armed bandit model with continuous time and perfect monitoring, where the players can observe each other's past actions and rewards. The main effects observed in symmetric equilibria are a free rider effect and an encouragement effect, where a player may explore more in order to encourage further exploration from others. Cripps, Keller, and Rady [CKR05] characterize the unique Markovian equilibrium of the game. They also show that asymmetric equilibria are more efficient than symmetric ones, as it is more useful for the players to take turns experimenting.
Heidhues, Rady, and Strack [HRS15] study the discrete version of this model and establish that in any Nash equilibrium, players stop experimenting once the common belief falls below a single-agent cut-off. They also show that the total number of experiments performed in equilibrium differs from the single-agent optimum by at most one. [HRS15] additionally study a model with imperfect monitoring, where the players can observe each other's actions but only their own rewards. The players can also communicate via cheap talk. One of the main finding is that cheap talk is incentive compatible and the socially optimal symmetric experimentation profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Klein and Rady [KR11] study the one-armed bandit model with public monitoring, where the correlation across bandits is negative. Rosenberg, Salomon, and Vieille [RSV] study the same model as [CKR05] , except the decision to switch from the risky arm to the safe one is irreversible.
Another line of work in economics studies the interplay between competition and innovation (see, e.g., D'Aspremont and Jackquemin [DJ88] ). Close to our high level direction is the work of Besanko and Wu [BW13] , which studies the tradeoff between cooperation and competition in R&D via learning in a one-armed bandit model, where the safe arm is the established product and the risky arm is the novel product. Our model is also related to the literature on stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (see, e.g., [APS90] ).
In evolutionary biology, there is a line of research dedicated to understanding the extremely high levels of cooperation observed in social insects (see, e.g., Anderson [And84] and Boomsma [Boo07] ), including designing mathematical models to explain why eusociality would evolve from natural selection (e.g., Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson [NTW10] ). Social learning was studied in the context of understanding altruistic behaviors such as sharing of information about food locations (see, e.g., Gruter, Leadbeater, and Ratnieks [GLR10] ).
The theme of incentivizing exploration was studied, for example, by Kremer, Mansour, and Perry [KMP13] , and Frazier, Kempe, Kleinberg, and Kleinberg [FKKK14] , where the problem is that a principal wants to explore a set of arms, but the exploration is done by a stream of myopic agents that have their own incentives and may prefer to exploit instead. Mansour, Slivkins, and Syrgkanis [MSS15] design Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms for such settings.
Aridor, Liu, Slivkins, and Wu [ALSW19] empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition in a model where multiple firms are competing for the same market of users and each firm commits to a multi-armed bandit algorithm. The objective of each firm is to maximize its market share and the question is when firms are incentivized to adopt better algorithms. Multi-armed bandit problems with strategic arms have been studied theoretically by Braverman, Mao, Schneider, and Weinberg [BMSW19] , in the setting where each arm receives a reward for being pulled and the goal of the principal is to incentivize the arms to pass on as much of their private rewards as possible to the principle.
Immorlica, Kalai, Lucier, Moitra, Postlewaite, and Tennenholtz [IKL + 11] study competitive versions of classic search and optimization problems by converting them to zero-sum games.
One of the open questions from [IKL + 11] was whether competition between algorithms improves or degrades expected performance in that framework, which was answered by Dehghani, Hajiaghayi, Mahini, and Seddighin [DHMS16] for the ranking duel and a more general class of dueling games.
Competitive Play (λ = −1)
In this section we study the zero-sum game, which has value zero by symmetry. This is an extensive-form game with an initial move by Nature; see [MSZ13, KP17] .
Observation 1. If selecting L in every round is the only optimal strategy for a single player, then in every optimal strategy for Alice in the zero sum game, she never explores, and similarly for Bob.
Proof. If Alice explores with positive probability and Bob never explores, then her expected net payoff will be negative by the hypothesis, since she is not learning anything from Bob's actions.
Theorem 1 (Competing players explore less, discounted). Suppose arm L has a known probability p and arm R has i.i.d. rewards with unknown success probability with prior µ (which is not a point mass). Assume that Alice and Bob are playing optimally in the zero sum game with discount factor β. Then there exists a threshold p * = p * (µ, β) ∈ (m, g), where g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins index of arm R, such that for all p > p * ,with probability 1 the players will not explore arm R. More precisely, define p * = inf p : arm R is not explored in any optimal play
We establish this by showing that a player using an optimal strategy is never the first to explore. However, each player will need as part of their strategy a contingency plan for what to do if the other player deviates from the main path. In fact, the strategy of always playing left is not part of any equilibrium. If Bob always plays left, then Alice can play the single player optimum (of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index) and win.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the following strategy S B for Bob: play left until Alice selects the right arm, say in some round k. Then play left again in round k + 1, and then starting with round k + 2 copy Alice's move from the previous round. In particular, Bob never plays left first. Fix an arbitrary pure strategy S A for Alice. If S A never explores first, then we are done. Otherwise, suppose S A explores first in round k. Then Alice's total reward Γ A = Γ A (S A , S B ) has expectation
Bob's total reward Γ B = Γ B (S A , S B ) has expectation
Note that E(γ A (k)) = m. Then the difference in rewards is
Since Bob is copying Alice, she is not learning anything from his actions, so her total reward from round k + 1 to ∞ is at most the maximum reward that a single player can obtain, namely g/(1 − β). Thus we can bound the difference between the players by
The right hand side of inequality (5) is negative when
Note that (mβ + g)/(1 + β) ∈ (m, g) and the players do not explore arm R for any p above this threshold. Thus p * ≤ (mβ + g)/(1 + β) as required.
We also show that competition reduces exploration for a large finite horizon.
Theorem 5 (Competing players explore less, finite horizon). Suppose arm L has a known probability p and arm R has a known distribution µ with mean m. Let T be the horizon and M * the maximum of the support of µ. We have 1. If p > (m + M * )/2, then the players do not explore arm R.
2. However, for every p < M * , if T is large enough, then a single player will explore given the same two arms.
Remark 2. Part 2 of Theorem 5 is due to Bradt, Johnson, and Karlin [BJK56] (see page 1073) and included for comparison. We can define in the finite horizon setting an index g T = g(µ, T ) as the infimum of p where playing always left is optimal for a single player. Part 2 of Theorem 5 is equivalent to
A similar proof shows that for any prior µ, we have
Proof of Theorem 5. For part 1 of the statement, we use the same strategy S B for Bob as in the proof of Theorem 1: play left until Alice selects the right arm, say in some round k. Then play left again in round k + 1, and then starting with round k + 2 copy Alice's move from the previous round.
Fix an arbitrary pure strategy S A for Alice. If S A never plays right first we are done. If Alice plays right for the first time in round k, then γ A (k) = m. Her expected total reward can be written as
Since from round k + 2 Bob is copying Alice's previous move, we have E(γ B (t)) = E(γ A (t − 1)) for all t ≥ k + 2. Then Bob's total expected reward is
If k = T , the difference in rewards is
If k ≤ T − 1, by choice of p > (m + M * )/2, the difference in rewards is bounded by
Thus Alice loses in expectation.
Part 2 of the statement holds since a single player (say Bob) optimizing his expected total reward has an algorithm with sublinear regret. Formally, the expected mean of the best arm is
If p < M * , then ξ > p. Bob's expected reward when playing optimally can be bounded from below by using a low regret algorithm (see, e.g., [BCB12] ), which gives
This will hold if
For such values of T , a regret minimizing algorithm will do better than playing left forever (in expectation).
Proof. Recall that m = 1 0 x dµ(x) and w = 1 0 (x − m) 2 dµ(x). Let S A and S B denote strategies for Alice and Bob, respectively. Define , S B ) ).
We will show there is a threshold p * = p * (m, w, β) > m such that for p < p * we have v 
If Alice saw 0, then the posterior mean is
t (x, y) denote the net value for Alice (= maxmin over mixed strategies) from the beginning of round t, when in round 1 she plays x and Bob plays y. Here, since we will let Alice declare her strategy first, we have y ∈ {L, R} (that is, y = L means that Bob plays left in round 1 no matter what; similarly y = R means that he plays right in round 1) and x ∈ {L, R, S}, where S is the following Alice round 1 strategy:
• Play left upon seeing 0 in round zero.
• Play right upon seeing 1 in round zero. Write δ = p − m ≥ 0. Then v 0 (x, y) = −δ + v 1 (x, y). Letṽ t (x, y) be defined in the same way as v t (x, y) when Bob knows Alice's record in round zero. Clearly,ṽ t (x, y) ≤ v t (x, y), for all strategies x, y.
By comparing the information available to the players based on the strategies played in rounds 0 and 1, observe:
• v 2 (x, L) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ {L, R, S}.
• v 2 (R, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ {L, R}.
Next we bound Alice's net value at round zero if Bob plays L and Alice plays strategy S:
If Bob plays L in round one and Alice plays R in round one no matter what bit she observed at round zero, then we have:
If both players play right in round one we get
We establish a few facts about the net gains of the players.
Proof. Recall that by definition ofṽ 2 (L, R), Bob knows two results from the right arm, while Alice knows only one. For v 2 (R, R) this is reversed, since in this case Alice knows two results from the right arm while Bob knows only one.
Proof. Note the first inequality holds since forṽ 2 (S, R) Alice tells Bob the bit she saw in round zero, while in the case of v 2 (S, R) she does not. The second inequality holds since by playing strategy S Alice has at least as much information as when playing L in round one, so she will do at least as well under S as she would do under L from round onwards.
By decomposing v 0 (S, R) into the payoff obtained in rounds zero, one, and the payoff from round two onwards, we obtain
Denote by R+S 2 the mixed strategy of Alice for round one in which she plays strategy R with probability 1/2 and strategy S with probability 1/2. By (11) and (12), we have
By (10) and (9), we obtain
Thus we can takep = m + βw/2, which completes the proof.
Remark 3. In the feedback model with perfect monitoring, where players observe each other's actions and rewards, the myopic strategy of selecting the arm with the highest current mean (in each round) is optimal. The reason is that exploration gives no future (informational) advantage to the exploring player.
In Appendix A we show improved bounds for a uniform prior and a plot with the upper and lower bounds obtained.
Cooperative Play (λ = 1)
Cooperating players aim to maximize the sum of their rewards and can agree on their strategies before the game starts. Later the players cannot communicate beyond seeing each other's actions.
We show that when the players are cooperating they explore even more than a single player. In particular, they explore even if the known arm has a probability p higher than the Gittins index of the right arm.
Recall the definitions of m 1 = 1 m 1 0 x 2 · dµ as posterior mean at the right arm after observing 1 in round zero, and of w = m · (m 1 − m).
Theorem 3 (Cooperating players explore more, discounted). Consider two cooperating players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass.
We first give a simple lower bound on the Gittins index, the proof of which is included for completeness. Recall that for an arm with prior µ, we have g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins index of the arm, m is the mean, and w is the variance of µ.
Lemma 3. Consider one arm with prior µ. Then g(µ, β) ≥ m + βw/2.
Proof. Suppose Alice is playing the one-armed bandit game by herself where the right arm has distribution µ that is not a point mass and left arm has known probability p = g = g(µ, β). Consider the following strategy for Alice:
• Round zero: play left.
• Round one: play left if 0 was observed in round zero, and right if 1 was observed.
• Round two onwards: play left.
Then by the definition of g, we have that this strategy for Alice is at most as good as retiring and receiving g forever, and so
Recall that m · m 1 = m 2 + w. Using this in (15) and rearranging, we obtain:
We can now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. In this proof we write Γ A = Γ A (p) to emphasize the dependence on p. At p = g, by definition of the Gittins index, Alice has a strategy starting at the right arm such that
Suppose Bob responds by playing L in rounds zero and one, then from round two onwards copies Alice's previous move. Then by inequality (5), applied at p = g, we get
Applying the same strategies at p = g + δ and comparing the total rewards to both players staying left gives
By Lemma 3, we infer that
Recall the index g T for finite horizon was defined in Remark 2.
Theorem 6 (Cooperating players explore more, finite horizon). Consider two cooperating players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem. The left arm is known and has probability p, while the right arm has a known distribution µ that is not a point mass. Let T be the horizon and M * the maximum of the support of µ. Then there exists δ = δ(T ) > 0 so that optimal players explore the right arm for all p < g T + δ.
Proof. Consider the same strategy for the players as in Theorem 5: Alice plays the one player optimal, while Bob plays left in rounds zero and one, and then from round two onwards he copies Alice's move from the previous round. The expected total reward of Alice is
Bob's expected reward is
On the other hand, the expected total reward of the players if they never explore is 2p(T + 1).
The difference between the two strategies is
Given that Alice is playing her single player optimal strategy, we have that for all p ≥ g T her total reward is bounded as follows:
Taking p = g T + δ for δ ≥ 0, the previous inequality is equivalent to
For ∆ to be strictly positive it suffices that
Recall that lim T →∞ g T = M * (Remark 2). Moreover, Alice's expected reward in the last round satisfies E(γ A (T )) ≤ M * when p < M * .
Let α = (M * − m)/4. Then there exists T 0 = T 0 (α) so that for all T ≥ T 0 , we have |g T − M * | < α. For all such T , by choice of α we have that
Then inequality (17) holds for all δ < (M * − m)/(4T ) as required.
Note that cooperating players do prefer the predictable arm for high enough values of p. Recall that M * is the maximum of the support of µ. Proposition 1. There is a threshold p • < M * so that cooperating players do not explore for any p > p • .
Proof. When m < p, the best case scenario for the cooperating players is that one of them (say Alice) plays right in round zero while Bob stays at left, and then from round one onwards both play right and the mean of the right arm is M * from round one onwards. Then any strategies S A and S B of the cooperating players will give at most this total reward, so:
The total reward of both players staying at the left arm is 2p/(1 − β) which is more than any strategies involving exploration when
gives the required statement.
Neutral Play (λ = 0)
In this section we study the scenario of λ = 0, where the players are only interested in their own rewards. Recall the solution concepts are Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We start with an observation.
Observation 2. For all p < g(µ, β), in any Nash equilibrium, each player explores with strictly positive probability.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium with strategies (S A , S B ), in which one player -say Alice -explores with probability zero. Then E(Γ A (S A , S B )) = p/(1 − β). Consider now the modified Alice strategy S A of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round (ignoring any information from Bob). Then since p < g(µ, β), there is α ∈ (p, g) so that E(Γ A (S A , S B )) = α/(1 − β) This is strictly higher than p/(1 − β), so S A is an improving deviation, in contradiction with (S A , S B ) being an equilibrium. Then Alice explores with strictly positive probability.
Theorem 4 (Neutral players learn from each other, discounted). Consider two neutral players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Then in any Nash equilibrium:
Proof of Theorem 4. Let α ∈ (p, g) denote the expected reward per round of a single player that follows the strategy of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round.
Part 1 : Assume p < g = g(µ, β). Since p < α, there exists > 0 so that p + < α. Let Λ = α/(1 − β) denote the expected total reward achievable by a single optimal player. Fix a pair of strategies (S A , S B ) that define a Nash equilibrium. Let Φ k = P(D c k ), where
Since (S A , S B ) is an equilibrium, we can bound the expected reward of a single player by
Rearranging the terms gives
Expanding the terms in the right hand side, we get a bound on α:
The same argument gives that for every ≥ 0 we have
inductively we obtain P(D k ) ≤ 1 − (α − p)/2 . This implies the required bound for D t :
Part 2 : Assume that p ∈ (p * , g), where p * is the threshold from equation (2) such that competing players do not explore for any p > p * . In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the total expected reward of each player is at least α/(1 − β), i.e. the single player optimum. Suppose towards a contradiction that there was a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with strategies (S A , S B ) where at least one of the players -say Bob -was getting exactly the expected reward of a single optimal player: E(Γ B ) = α/(1 − β). Note that Alice must explore with positive probability regardless of what Bob does, since the single player optimum does better than never exploring. Consider now the following strategy S B for Bob: stay left in every round until Alice explores for the first time. If Alice's exploration occurs in some round k, then from round k + 1 onwards, let Bob use the optimal strategy that he would play when competing against Alice in the corresponding zero-sum game that starts at round k (where Alice is forced to play right and Bob left in round k, and both play optimally afterwards). By Theorem 1, if Alice does explore the right arm at k, then when p ∈ (p * , g) Bob wins against Alice.
Let Γ A and Γ B be the total rewards of the players under strategies (S A , S B ). Since the equilibrium is perfect Bayesian, it must be the case that E(Γ A ) ≥ α/(1−β). Moreover, since Alice is not learning anything from Bob's strategy S B , she can only realize this minimum expected value by using an optimal strategy for a single player, which requires exploring with positive probability.
We classify the trajectories realizable under strategies (S A , S B ) in two types, depending on whether Alice explores the right arm or not on that trajectory:
1. Alice does not explore: then Bob always plays left too, so they get the same reward. 2. Alice explores: then Bob's expected reward is strictly greater than Alice's total reward on that trajectory (since he wins in the corresponding zero sum game that starts with Alice's first exploration).
Taking expectation over all possible trajectories and noting that Alice explores with positive probability, we get that Bob's deviation S B ensures he gets expected total reward strictly greater than Alice, so
. Thus deviation S B is profitable, in contradiction with (S A , S B ) being an equilibrium. Then both players get strictly more than the single player optimum.
Corollary 1. With positive probability, in each perfect Bayesian equilibrium the players do not have the same trajectory.
Proof. The conclusion follows from part 2 of Theorem 4. If the players always had the same trajectory, then the best total reward achievable would be the single player optimum.
In contrast, there exist Nash equilibria where the players have the same trajectory with probability 1. Such play can be supported by using (non-credible) threats in case one of the players deviates from the Nash equilibrium path.
Example 1 (Perfect Bayesian vs. Nash equilibrium). There is a Nash equilibrium in which both players follow the same trajectory and play the one player optimal strategy of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round.
To see why this is the case, define the strategies of the players as follows:
• Pull the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round, as long as the other player did the same in the previous round.
• If in some round k one of the players, say Alice, chooses a different action, then Bob switches to playing left forever from round k + 1 onwards (and similarly if Bob deviates).
Note that with these strategies, if Alice deviates in some round k, then she cannot learn anything from Bob in rounds {k + 1, k + 2, . . .}. Alice also did not learn anything from Bob in rounds 0 to k since they had the same trajectory. Then Alice's expected reward overall cannot be better than the single player optimum, so the deviation is not strictly improving. Thus the strategies form a Nash equilibrium.
Observation 3. For p ≥ g(µ, β), there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the players never explore: the pair of strategies in which each player stays left no matter what happens is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We show that the players also learn from each other in the finite horizon game. First recall that g T is the index for finite horizon T and M * is the maximum of the support of µ. Formally, we have the next theorem.
Theorem 7 (Neutral players learn from each other, finite horizon). Consider two neutral players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with horizon T . The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Then in any subgame perfect equilibrium:
1. For all p < M * , with probability that converges to 1 as T grows, at least one player explores.
Moreover, the probability that no player explores by time t decays polynomially in t.
2. Suppose (m + M * )/2 < p < M * . Then every (neutral) player has expected reward strictly higher than a single optimal player.
Proof. Recall g T denotes the index of the right arm. Let α · (T + 1) be the expected reward of an optimal single player, where α ∈ (p, g T ).
Part 1 : Let p < M * . We show there exist ψ = ψ(µ, p) > 0 and C < ∞ so that the inequality
holds for all Nash equilibria (S A , S B ). First, since p < M * , there exist T 1 and α > p so that for all T ≥ T 1 , the single player optimum over rounds {0, . . . , T } is in expectation at least α · (T + 1).
For a sequence {T j } monotonically decreasing (to be specified later) and for T > T 1 , write Fix j and let k = T j+1 − T j . A depiction of the intervals induced by the sequence T j is given in Figure 2 .
This implies the inequality:
Choose k such that (α − p) · k ∈ T j + 1, T j + 2 . We obtain
Since {T j } grows exponentially, by (18), the claim follows from (19).
Part 2 : The proof is similar to the discounted case, so we give a sketch highlighting the differences. Let (S A , S B ) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where Bob gets exactly the single player optimum: E(Γ B ) = α · (T + 1). Since the horizon T is large, Alice explores with positive probability (see part 2 of Theorem 5). Consider deviation S B for Bob: stay left in every round until Alice explores for the first time (e.g. in round k), and from round k + 1 onwards, use the optimal zero-sum strategy. Let Γ A and Γ B be the total rewards under (S A , S B ). Since the equilibrium is perfect Bayesian, E(Γ A ) ≥ α · (T + 1). Alice is not learning from Bob under S B , so she must explore with positive probability. We classify the trajectories realizable under (S A , S B ) in two types:
1. Alice does not explore: then Bob always plays left too, so they get the same total reward. Taking expectation over all possible trajectories and noting that Alice explores with positive probability, it follows that Bob's deviation S B ensures he gets expected total reward strictly greater than Alice. Then we get
. Then Bob's deviation S B is profitable, in contradiction with the choice of equilibrium strategies (S A , S B ).
Discussion
The multiplayer bandit learning model can be used to study other phenomena, such as designing optimal patent protection policies. For example, if Alice is the player to explore some arm for the first time, then a patent for her could mean that Bob cannot pull that arm for k rounds afterwards, or alternatively, Bob should give Alice a fraction α of the rewards collected whenever pulling the same arm in the k rounds following her first exploration. 
A Competitive Play: Improved Bounds for a Uniform Prior
In this section we give improved bounds for the thresholds in the case of an arm with a uniform prior. In particular, we show that both players will explore the risky arm for all p < 5/9 and will not explore for all p > 2 − √ 2.
Proposition 2. Let arm L have a known probability p and arm R with a uniform prior that is common knowledge. Then both players will explore arm R with positive probability for all p < 5/9 as the discount factor β → 1.
Proof. To prove this, we consider the scenario where in round zero Bob is forced to play L and Alice is forced to play R, while the players can play optimally afterwards. Then we show that Alice wins for all p < 5/9 as β → 1 regardless of Bob's strategy, which will imply that in any equilibrium the players will both play the right arm in round zero. Consider now the scenario where they are forced to play as described above and define the following strategy for Alice:
1. If the bit observed in round zero is 0, then play L in round 1. Then
• If Bob played R in round 1, then play L in round 2 and from round 3 onwards copy Bob's arm from the previous round.
• If Bob played L in round 1, then play optimally from round 2 onwards.
2. Else, if the bit observed in round zero is 1, then play R again in round 1. Play optimally from round 2 onwards.
We show that Alice wins in expectation regardless of Bob's counterstrategy. For round zero we have E(γ A (0)) = 1/2 and E(γ B (0)) = p. Alice's expected payoff in round 1 depends on whether she got a 0 or a 1 in round zero: E(γ A (1)) = 1/2 · p + 1/2 · 2/3 = 1/2 · p + 1/3. To analyze Alice's payoff in round two and Bob's maximum expected reward overall we consider two cases, depending on Bob's move in round one. We assume that Bob plays optimally from round two onwards. Note also that Bob's decision for what arm to play in round one cannot depend on Alice's bit, so it is in fact determined at round zero.
Case 1 : Bob plays R in round one. Denote by γ A (t|1, R) Alice's reward in round t given that she saw a 1 in round zero and that Bob's strategy is to play R in round one, and similarly for γ A (t|0, R). Then Alice's expected total reward is: E(Γ A ) = E(γ A (0)) + E(γ A (1)) · β + E(γ A (2)) · β 2 + ∞ t=3 E(γ A (t)) · β t = 1 2 + β p 2 + 1 3
Bob's expected net gain is E(Γ B ) − E(Γ A ) = p · (1 + β) − 1/2 − (1 − β) · ∞ t=1 E(γ A (t)) · β t . Let X be a random variable with a uniform prior. Then Alice's expected value at round t can be bounded by the expected maximum of p and X, so Then for all p > 2 − √ 2 Bob's net gain is strictly positive, thus Alice is at a disadvantage by playing the right arm in round zero. It follows that Alice is better off by playing the left arm in round zero, and so the players will never explore arm R in any equilibrium. where the right arm has a uniform prior and β → 1: the red line shows the lower bound on Alice's net gain given by the function lb(p) = min{1/6 + p 3 /6 − p 2 /2, 5/6 − 3p/2} (Proposition 2) when in round zero she starts at the right arm and Bob starts at left, after which they both play optimally. The green line shows the corresponding upper bound on Alice's net gain given by ub(p) = p 2 /2 + 1 − 2p (Proposition 3).
